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I. INTRODUCTION: THE DAY THE MAGIC DIED
February 3, 1959.' "The day the music died."2
January 17, 2003. The day the magic died. That's what I thought when I
first heard of Mary Dunlap's death. I knew she had been ill. I knew there was
little hope left as the cancer in her body spread. But I just could not imagine a
world without Mary. Even after her death, I could not imagine such a world.
She wasn't a professional magician or musician, although she did create things
magical and she loved music. She had the vision and understanding of an artist
and she shared the power and creativity of her insights in words and images. She
was, for most of her professional life, a civil rights lawyer.
I first met Mary in the 1970s. I knew her as a co-founder of Equal Rights
Advocates and as a frequent speaker at the National Conference on Women and
the Law. Her energy, creative thinking and passionate advocacy inspired me. I
had never met anyone like Mary. I considered her a national treasure. Recog-
nizing the unique value that she brought to the practice and teaching of law, I
concluded somewhere along the line that it was my personal duty to share this
"national treasure" with my students. So I leaned on Mary to come to Texas on
several occasions to talk to my students there and to spend time with my students
in California when I was a visiting professor at the University of Southern Cali-
fornia. She always graciously agreed, and I continue to treasure the memory of
Copyright © 2004, The Regents of the University of California.
t. Aliber Family Chair in Law and Interim Provost, University of Iowa. I am grateful to my
research assistant, James Burgess, who provided excellent and timely research for this pro-
ject.
1. Shortly after midnight, early in the morning of February 3, 1959, a private plane fell from the
Iowa skies close to Mason City. Iowa Air Crash Kills 3 Singers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1959,
at 66. Killed in the accident were musicians Buddy Holly, Ritchie Valens, and J.P. Richard-
son (known as "The Big Bopper"). Id. The twenty-one-year-old pilot, Roger Peters, also
died in the crash. Id.
2. See DON MCCLEAN, American Pie, on AMERICAN PIE (United Artists 1971).
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each magic moment in those classes.
Mary was a brilliant lawyer. She argued twice before the Supreme Court:
once on behalf of pregnant schoolteachers,3 and once on behalf of the Gay
Olympics. 4 She sued the city;' she sued the military. 6 And she served as a role
model for the next generation of lesbian and gay rights lawyers.
Mary was the epitome of those people we often describe as "bigger than
life." Some would say she could fill up a room. That is true, but what I remem-
ber most is the way she gave you her rapt attention if you were in the room with
her. Even when we had not seen each other for years, when we would happen to
meet, there was an instant connection. She would speak your name and then en-
gage personally in a way that made you feel that you were the only person in the
room.
Because I am a law teacher, I want to include in this essay some specific
words about Mary as a teacher and scholar. She was brave in the classroom.
She was not afraid to be "out" as a lesbian even in the 1970s. Her first stint as a
full-time law teacher was in 1979 at the University of Texas, where I was teach-
ing at the time. Despite the demands of full-time law teaching, she never aban-
doned her advocacy. She lawyered for women who were being denied tenure
and for a gay male couple who had been thrown out of an Austin hotel in viola-
tion of the local antidiscrimination ordinance. Her teaching was informed by her
activism, and her activism was informed by her teaching.
Mary was also a legal scholar. A Texas colleague once complained, as
only law professors can do, that her scholarship was political. Of course it was.
Mary could no more check her passion at the door when she was writing scholar-
ship than at any other time in her life. But it was brilliant scholarship. Well be-
fore the transgender movement took hold, Mary was writing about the
male/female dichotomy and arguing that sex was not an either/or category.
7
While scholars carefully developed privacy theories to explain the constitutional
right to intimate sex, Mary named it correctly: the "right to be sexual."8 The
amicus brief she wrote in Bowers v. Hardwick was the only brief that described
our choice to love as a moral one, worthy of constitutional protection, apart from
geographical concerns about privacy.10Her life has been celebrated by her friends. Her art has been displayed in
3. Richmond Unified Sch. Dist. v. Berg, 434 U.S. 158 (1977).
4. S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (1987).
5. United States v. City & County of S.F., 656 F. Supp. 276 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
6. Saal v. Middendorf, 427 F. Supp. 192 (N.D. Cal. 1977), rev'd sub nom. Belier v. Midden-
doff, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980).
7. Mary C. Dunlap, The Constitutional Rights of Sexual Minorities: A Crisis of the
Male/Female Dichotomy, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1131 (1979).
8. Mary C. Dunlap, Toward Recognition of "A Right to Be Sexual", 7 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP.
245 (1982) [hereinafter Dunlap, Right to Be Sexual].
9. 478 U.S. 186(1986).
10. Brief of Amici Curiae Lesbian Rights Project et al., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
(1986), reprinted in Mary C. Dunlap, Introduction to Amicus Brief in Bowers v. Hardwick,
14 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 949, 953 (1986).
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public settings. Here, in the Berkeley Women's Law Journal, I want to pay trib-
ute to her scholarship.
II. THE RIGHT TO BE SEXUAL
The Supreme Court recognized a new fundamental right in 1965. In Gris-
wold v. Connecticut,' Justice Douglas called it the right to privacy. Mary first
called it the right to be sexual in 1982.2
The Griswold decision paved the way for constitutional recognition of the
rights of lesbians and gay men. Griswold held that marital privacy was a funda-
mental right, and thus the government could interfere with that right only for
compelling reasons." Griswold was limited to marital privacy, but the Court
quickly extended this right to unmarried individuals in Eisenstadt v. Baird.
4
Other privacy decisions of this era similarly focused on things sexual. 5
Yet the Court, in all of its privacy decisions, avoided talking about sex. In-
stead, opinions focused on marriage, the marital bedroom, the home, and the
right to choose whether to have children. In striking down governmental regula-
tion that interfered with marriage, the bedroom, privacy in the home, and choices
about procreation, the Court often distanced itself from other criminal statutes
that regulated sexual relations, such as incest, fornication, adultery, and sod-
16
omy. Because the Court never developed a positive concept of sexual relation-
ships, it was never able to articulate exactly what it was that was positive and
valued about the activities occurring in marital bedrooms 7 and in the bedrooms
of unmarried couples who chose sexual activities that included birth control.'
Absent any clear theory of why sexual activity should sometimes be protected
from government regulation, the Court invited progressive litigators to challenge
all types of sexual repression. The fundamental right to privacy recognized by
the Griswold Court served as a central argument in cases that challenged (unsuc-
11. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
12. Dunlap, Right to Be Sexual, supra note 8, at 245.
13. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86.
14. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). There is some question whether the Eisenstadt Court relied on equal
protection or due process in striking down the state restrictions on distribution of contracep-
tives. Nonetheless, the Court unquestionably extended the Griswold right to privacy to un-
married persons when it proclaimed: "[I]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the right
of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child."
Id. at 453.
15. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (recognizing privacy rights in
minors who wished to use contraception); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (recognizing
privacy rights in women who wished to terminate a pregnancy); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S.
557 (1967) (reversing conviction of a man who viewed obscene material in the privacy of his
own home).
16. See, e.g., Poe v. Ulman, 367 U.S. 497, 551-52 (Harlan, J., dissenting), cited in Griswold, 381
U.S. at 495 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
17. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486.
18. See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
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cessfully) discriminatory marriage statutes'9 and in cases that challenged (some-
times successfully) sodomy statutes.20 Finally, the Court drew a line in its pri-
vacy jurisprudence.' Perhaps it was the lack of clear theory and positive articu-
lation that led the Court to draw the line as silently as possible. In 1976, the
Court summarily affirmed a federal district court ruling in favor of Virginia's
sodomy statute, holding that the statute did not implicate the privacy rights of the
gay men and lesbians who challenged its application to them in situations involv-
ing consensual adults in private settings.22 In summarily affirming the holding
below, the Court elected not to have oral arguments in the case and not to issue a
written opinion.
It was this "silent" line drawing, together with a handful of other lower
court opinions, drawing lines between good and bad sex, that prompted Mary
Dunlap to argue that the privacy decisions imply there is a constitutionally pro-
tected "right to be sexual." I could not agree more. But, lesbians and gay men
are only a part of the focus in her argument for the right to be sexual. And
herein lies Mary's brilliance as an advocate and insightful human being. She be-
gins her argument for the right to be sexual by focusing on groups beyond her
own. First, she discusses a case that seems to question whether older people
24have sexual needs at all . Next, she focuses on a case that questions the sexual
rights of young interracial couples." If the right to be sexual is fundamental,
then it must be equally available to us all.
Concluding that the privacy cases imply an underlying right to be sexual,
Dunlap bravely moves to the most problematic question about sexual rights: how
26to distinguish authentic claims from destructive ones. Here she says:
Perhaps the sharpest challenge posed by the notion that people have a
right to be sexual arises in regard to the question of what limitations are
19. Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971) (holding that Griswold could not be
stretched to support a constitutional claim to same-sex marriage).
20. See, e.g., Buchanan v. Batchelor, 308 F. Supp. 729 (N.D. Tex. 1970) (holding Texas sodomy
statute unconstitutional because it was broad enough to apply to married couples), vacated,
Wade v. Buchanan, 401 U.S. 989 (1971) (questioning standing of gay defendant in sodomy
case to challenge statute on basis of invasion of marital privacy); see also State v. Pilcher,
242 N.W.2d 348 (Iowa 1976) (relying heavily on Griswold to strike down Iowa's sodomy
statute).
21. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 425 U.S. 901 (1976), summarily affg 403 F. Supp. 1199
(E.D. Va. 1975).
22. Id.
23. I have done so in writing elsewhere. See Patricia A. Cain, The Right to Privacy Under the
Montana Constitution: Sex and Intimacy, 64 MONT. L. REV. 99 (2003).
24. Wagner v. Sheltz, 471 F. Supp. 903 (D. Conn. 1979). (While the claim in the case hinges on
the plaintiff's failure to meet the state action requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment,
Dunlap uses the case to question decisions based on assumptions about inappropriate roman-
tic or intimate behavior of elderly people in nursing homes).
25. Fiedler v. Marumsco Baptist Church, 486 F. Supp. 960 (E.D. Va. 1979), rev'd sub nom.
Fiedler v. Marumsco Christian School, 631 F.2d 1144 (4th Cir. 1980) (holding that the
school could not restrict interracial dating).
26. Dunlap, Right to Be Sexual, supra note 8, at 248.
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to be placed on such a right. The realities of sexual violence, exploita-
tion, and repressiveness in our society, and the tendency of "rights" to
become chiefly the possessions of those empowered to define them, ren-
der the issue of legal limits intensely difficult and controversial. Once
we have rejected the idea that "proper" sexual behavior in the female
consists of nothing more, less or different than sexual intercourse within
the bounds of a legally valid marriage - aimed at pregnancy and result-
ing in childbirth and the fulfillment of the "noble and benign offices of
wife and mother"27-and once we have rejected all related notions of
"impropriety" based on gender, we face a vast and difficult array of
questions. These questions will not merely be directed toward develop-
ing a strategy for implementing sexual freedom; they will address the
purposes and directions of the newly gained freedom to be sexual.2"
This is "vintage Mary," who was never a fan of short sentences because,
after all, everything is connected to everything else, and why stop before you've
given every punch you can to the idea. And then, just as she has you focusing on
whatever content you may be willing to argue should be included in this new
right to be sexual, she pulls another Mary punch: don't ever be too sure about
your own self-righteousness. Or, in her own words:
The inclination to be moralistic about one's own definition of sexual pro-
priety is exceedingly strong. Tolerance of sexual behavior that does not
fit within one's own definition of what is "natural," "healthy," or
"positive" - regardless of the actual contents of those definitions - rarely
demonstrates itself in legal and political domains. Self-righteousness as
to one's definitions of sexual propriety is perhaps as deep-founded as the
individual's sense of boundaries upon his/her privacy and identity.2
Here, she is speaking not only to the fundamentalists, the Jerry Falwells,
and the narrow-minded prudes in this country. She is also speaking to lesbians
who question the permissiveness of gay male bathhouses and same-sex couples
who bristle at the notion of threesomes. She is asking all of us to check our bi-
ases at the door and ponder openly the question of what exactly the right to be
sexual should protect.
M. BOWERS V. HARDWICK
In 1986, the Supreme Court was given the chance to clarify its line-
drawing on the question of sexual privacy.3° Michael Hardwick, a gay male, had
been arrested by the Atlanta police for committing sodomy (oral sex) with an-
other male in the privacy of his own bedroom.3 The question before the Court
27. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring).
28. Dunlap, Right to Be Sexual, supra note 8, at 248.
29. Id. at 248-49.
30. See generally Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
31. Id. at 187-88.
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was whether the state of Georgia could justify the pursuit of same-sex private
consensual liaisons by threatening to throw offenders in jail for twenty years un-
der its sodomy statute.32 Professor Laurence Tribe briefed the case for Michael
Hardwick and argued the case before the Court. Tribe focused on the geographi-
cal location of the alleged crime and argued that the right to privacy surely in-
cluded the right to have consensual sex of any sort in the privacy of one's own
bedroom without risk that the State would come barging in. The justices ques-
tioned Tribe about where to draw the line. Exactly which activities would be
protected just because they occurred in private? And exactly how private would
the location of the activity have to be? The bedroom? A motel room? An auto-
mobile?33
Tribe's answers were solid. Line drawing was easy. Consensual sex be-
tween adults in private caused no harm. And this case did involve the bedroom.
No need to draw the line, for now, beyond that.
Mary Dunlap bristled at these arguments. Line drawing of this sort and
privacy arguments based on geography did not honor her principle of the right to
be sexual. The Tribe argument could be interpreted to say yes, what these two
men did was wrong, but since it happened in the privacy of their own bedroom,
the state has no justified reason to be concerned. Dunlap wanted to argue about
the beauty and the value of the shared sexual intimacy and not about the geogra-
phy. So she did. She co-authored an amicus curiae brief on behalf of the Les-
bian Rights Project.34
Describing the brief, Dunlap says:
[T]he brief took a more radical position, and a more plainly pro-
gay/lesbian position, than did the brief in support of respondent Hard-
wick. The principal brief for the respondents and the oral argument of
Professor Laurence Tribe emphasized the fourth amendment physical
privacy of the bedroom, while the Lesbian Rights Project amicus focused
upon the personal privacy of gay, lesbian, and bisexual persons, and on
the constitutional implications of that human-centered privacy concept.
The respondents' brief assured the Supreme Court that a ruling for
Hardwick would not be a ruling in favor of the legitimation of
gay/lesbian persons and relationships. In contrast, the Lesbian Rights
Project et al. forthrightly argued that because gay men and lesbians con-
stitute an oppressed minority worthy of constitutional protection, the
Court was required by law to render a decision which would legitimate
32. Id. at 188 n.1.
33. The oral argument in Hardwick can be heard on the Internet at OYEZ: U.S. SUPREME COURT
MULTIMEDIA, http://www.oyez.org (last visited Apr. 7, 2004).
34. The Lesbian Rights Project began at the public interest law firm of Equal Rights Advocates.
In 1989, the project was transformed into the National Center for Lesbian Rights. See
EQUAL RIGHTS ADVOCATES, SPINOFFS OF ERA, http://www.equalrights.org/
about/spinoffs.asp (last visited Mar. 10, 2004).
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gay/lesbian persons and relationships.35
The Court ultimately ruled against Michael Hardwick, refusing to recog-
nize even his narrowly constructed privacy rights.36 In a street protest following
the decision, Mary stood above the crowd waving the opinion in her hand, and
then she shredded it to bits.37 Bowers v. Hardwick became the law of the land,
and it would have to be overruled.
In a 1994 law review article, 8 Mary Dunlap challenged gay legal advocates
to stop litigating around Hardwick39 and instead to challenge its validity more
directly:
In the wake of the Hardwick decision, many commented that the litiga-
tion of Hardwick had been a mistake, and the case should never have
been taken to the, or at least this, Supreme Court.
... [T]o say that Hardwick should not have been litigated is more
than a bit like saying that someone who got gaybashed in a hostile
neighborhood should not have gone there, or should have been differ-
ently dressed, and so on and so on. As long as the courts are unsafe to
us, just as the streets, we will not progress by hiding indoors.
... We must focus on directly and actively working to overturn
Hardwick by planned legal actions (including but by no means limited to
direct "sodomy" law challenges in courts and legislatures,) as well as by
indirect challenges seeking to limit Hardwick's harmful seepage into
non-criminal law areas, and, perhaps most affirmatively and hopefully,
by commencing and sustaining a national drive to adopt "privacy" as an
explicit guarantee of the U.S. Constitution.
If, instead of these pro-active and aggressive steps, we get caught up in
35. Mary C. Dunlap, Introduction to Amicus Brief in Bowers v. Hardwick, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 949,950 (1986).
36. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 196.
37. Mary C. Dunlap, Gay Men and Lesbians Down By Law in the 1990's USA: The Continuing
Toll of Bowers v. Hardwick, 24 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 1, 5 n.9 (1994) [hereinafter
Dunlap, Continuing Toll].
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., Nan D. Hunter, Life After Hardwick, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 531 (1992).
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adapting to Hardwick and in shifting and reconstructing and settling for
trying to find ways around it, then surely for as long as Hardwick re-
mains "citeable law," we will continue to see our frustration, rage and
grief rise... As long as Hardwick remains, with its open permission to
government and citizens alike to mistreat gay, lesbian and other sexual
minority people, not only our privacy but our peace, safety, equality of
opportunity and of human compassion and co-operation are jeopardized.
If we are to make progress within law in this phase and quarter of the
human rights movement, the monument of Bowers v. Hardwick must fall
promptly, absolutely and irreversibly. 4'
IV. LAWRENCE V. TEXAS
On June 26, 2003 just six months after Mary's untimely death, the Su-
preme Court of the United States laid to rest Bowers v. Hardwick once and for
all.4' Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, a fact that would have surprised
Mary,42 could not have said it more clearly: "Bowers was not correct when it was
decided, and it is not correct today. It ought not to remain binding precedent.
Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is overruled." 3
Yes, Mary Dunlap would have rejoiced in this resounding reversal. But if
she were with us today, I know she would not be silent. She'd be asking ques-
tions. What is this liberty interest that the Court has recognized? Is it a funda-
mental right? Will it protect elderly women in nursing homes who retain their
sexual identities? Will it protect young interracial couples, gay and nongay? Is
this liberty interest the beginning of the "right to be sexual"? If so, how far will
it take us?
Mary, the missing scholar, would expect those of us who were her friends
to help answer these questions. They are the same questions she asked in 1982,
when she first argued for a right to be sexual:
What seem to be good primary elements of a "right to be sexual"? Can
such a right be adequately defined by reference to sexual privacy? What
of sexual expression, and what of free speech and association related to
sex? How can the right be sexual, as exercised by those who insist that
privacy means secrecy and non-accountability, be harmonized with the
right to be sexual, as exercised by those who insist that secrecy and non-
accountability in sexual matters leads to suffering, disorder in relation-
40. Dunlap, Continuing Toll, supra note 37, at 5, 7, 38-39.
41. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 Sup. Ct. 2472 (2003).
42. Mary argued Saal v. Middendorf, 427 F. Supp. 192 (N.D. Cal. 1977), rev'd sub nom. Beller
v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980), before Justice Kennedy when he was on the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. She lost the case. While some read Kennedy's opin-
ion as holding out hope for gay equality in the future, Dunlap's sense of Kennedy from the
personal encounters surrounding the argument was that he did not respect lesbians and gay
men. I am certain she would have been thrilled to be proved wrong.
43. Lawrence, 123 Sup. Ct. at 2484.
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ships and usurpation of disadvantaged persons?"
Good questions, Mary.
MARY C. DUNLAP: SELECTED WORKS
SEX DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT-APPLICATION OF TITLE VII
(Mary C. Dunlap ed., 1975).
Mary C. Dunlap, The Legal Road to Equal Employment Opportunity: A
Critical View, in AMERICAN WOMEN WORKERS IN A FULL EMPLOYMENT
ECONOMY, A COMPENDIUM OF PAPERS SUBMI'TED TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON
ECONOMIC GROWTH AND STABILIZATION OF THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE,
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, 95TH CON., 1ST SESS. 61 (1977).
Mary C. Dunlap, The Constitutional Rights of Sexual Minorities: A Crisis
of the Male/Female Dichotomy, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1131 (1979). This work de-
scribes the fallacy of the "only two sexes" presumption in the American legal
system and details the implication of this presumption for the constitutional
claims of sexual minorities.
Mary C. Dunlap, Where the Person Ends, Does the Government Begin?
An Explanation of Present Controversies Concerning "The Right to Privacy,"
12 LINCOLN L. REv. 47 (1981). Describing, analyzing, and criticizing the consti-
tutional structuring of the right to privacy, Dunlap focuses on the extreme gap
between an individual's complete lack of privacy on death row and the imagi-
nary transcendental mountaintop where one enjoys full privacy and attempts to
uncover the character and core makeup of the right.
Mary C. Dunlap, Toward Recognition of "A Right to Be Sexual", 7
WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 245 (1982). This piece examines the Supreme Court's
past cases involving sex discrimination and privacy and notes the Court's limited
recognition of privacy in certain "normative" behaviors, such as marriage and
procreation. It recognizes two kinds of claims to the "right to be sexual" (au-
thentic and destructive) and proposes "directions for the continuing struggle."
Ellen C. DuBois, Mary C. Dunlap, Carol J. Gilligan, Catharine A.
MacKinnon, & Carrie J. Menkel-Meadow, The James McCormick Mitchell Lec-
ture: Feminist Discourse, Moral Values, and the Law-A Conversation, 34
BUFFALO L. REv. 11 (1985). Four feminists discuss the progress of feminism,
and Dunlap aligns herself with a world view of total equality between the sexes
rather than female-or male-superiority. This event is remembered for the
moment in which MacKinnon makes her claim that all women are subservient to
all men all of the time, and Dunlap asks for women who disagree to stand.
Mary C. Dunlap, Employment, in NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD, SEXUAL
ORIENTATION AND THE LAW 5-1 (Roberta Achtenberg ed., 1985).
Mary C. Dunlap & Jose Gomez, First Amendment, in NATIONAL LAWYERS
GUILD, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW 9-1 (Roberta Achtenberg ed.,
44. Dunlap, Right to Be Sexual, supra note 8, at 249.
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1985).
Mary C. Dunlap, Introduction to Amicus Brief in Bowers v. Hardwick, 14
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 949 (1986). This work addresses the patterns
that had emerged in recent "hot" Supreme Court cases, especially the patterns
among amicus briefs. The brief submitted on behalf of the Lesbian Rights Pro-
ject in Bowers v. Hardwick (which was reprinted in the pages following
Dunlap's article) followed the named patterns to a great degree. Dunlap pro-
posed that such "vibrantly dissenting voices" must continue to inform the Su-
preme Court, even in the face of decisions such as Bowers.
Mary C. Dunlap, Sexual Speech and The State: Putting Pornography in Its
Place, 17 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 359 (1987). Taking a closer and more de-
liberate examination of the anti-pornography campaign following American
Booksellers v. Hudnut and looking at the broader legal, political, and psycho-
logical consequences of the drive against pornography, the author explains why
the campaign had serious and ill-considered implications for a broader category
of communications, which could be called "sexual speech."
Mary C. Dunlap, AIDS and Discrimination in the United States: Reflec-
tions on the Nature of Prejudice in a Virus, 34 VILL. L. REV. 909 (1989). Noting
that AIDS was a disease that discriminated and disproportionately affected sex-
ual and racial minorities and intravenous drug users, Dunlap argued that (1) fear
of people with AIDS, rather than fear of the HIV virus, is irrational and promotes
prejudices against persons believed to be at high risk for HIV infections, and (2)
the AIDS crisis was a "magnifying glass," through which the institutional
strengths and weaknesses of the nation and society could be viewed.
Mary C. Dunlap, The "F" Word: Mainstreaming and Marginalizing Femi-
nism, 4 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 251 (1989). Noting that "feminism" was
widely perceived as a "dirty" word, the author stresses the power of the word to
challenge and provoke change. Dunlap posits several other "F" words that were
in greater need of consideration: five-four (as in the 5-4 "Gay Olympics" and
Frontiero v. Richardson decisions), fetus fetishism (regarding the Court's forays
into the abortion controversy), the fanatical right and other frightful "F" words,
and legal fictions (such as the reasonable man standard and equal justice under
law).
Mary C. Dunlap, Law and Society: Foundering on the Seas of Hopeless-
ness, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1366 (1989) (reviewing RICHARD D. MOHR,
GAYS/JUSTICE: A STUDY OF ETHICS, SOCIETY, AND LAW (1988)). Dunlap criti-
cizes Mohr's reliance on stereotypes and argues that he should have developed
analogies to other civil rights movements and abuses.
Mary C. Dunlap, The Lesbian and Gay Marriage Debate: A Microcosm of
Our Hopes and Troubles in the Nineties, I L. & SEXUALITY 63 (1991). This
work explores the array of policy issues that arise from the possibility of permit-
ting same-sex marriage in the United States and considers not only the wide-
spread legalistic and feminist criticisms of the institution of marriage, but also
the personal and cultural experiences that come with the institution. Dunlap be-
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lieved that some civil rights lawyers would in the not-so-distant future conduct a
campaign to provide same-sex marriage. If only she could see where we are to-
day in 2004.
Mary C. Dunlap, Mediating the Abortion Controversy: A Callfor Modera-
tion, or for One-Sided Etiquette While the Bombs Keep Flying?, 30 WASHBURN
L.J. 41 (1990-1991) (reviewing LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF
ABSOLUTES (1990)). Dunlap criticizes Tribe for the lack of attention given to
the sex discrimination aspects of the abortion debate and for his silence as to the
effects of Bowers v. Hardwick on the Roe v. Wade decision.
Mary C. Dunlap, Gay Men and Lesbians Down by Law in the 1990's USA:
The Continuing Toll of Bowers v. Hardwick, 24 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 1
(1994). Dunlap argues that the post-Bowers situation for the GLBT population
was even more dire than many realized. She points out that while some mem-
bers of the community attempted to work through the courts, others engaged in
acts of civil disobedience, and others in "outing" to draw "confrontational reac-
tion against that person's closeted identity."
Mary C. Dunlap, Are We Integrated Yet? Pursuing the Complex Question
of Values, Demographics and Personalities, 29 U.S.F. L. REv. 693 (1995). This
piece is an essay about Title VII and stereotypes, in which she contrasts Justice
Thurgood Marshall with Justice Clarence Thomas.
Mary C. Dunlap, Choosing, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: PRO AND CON 124-
28 (Andrew Sullivan ed., 1997).
Mary C. Dunlap, Trial Practice in Civil Cases Concerning Gender-
Motivated Violence, in VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: LAW AND LITIGATION 12-1
(David Frazee, Ann M. Noel, Andrea Brenneke, & Mary C. Dunlap eds., 1997).
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Nude, by
Mary Dunlap
(1992)
Charcoal,
18" x 24"
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Postscript
The Boalt Hall Queer Caucus established the Mary C. Dunlap Memorial
Fellowship in 2004 to provide grants to Boalt Hall students spending their sum-
mer working with traditionally invisible or underserved segments of the queer
community, broadly defined (for example, projects assisting transgendered or
intersex individuals, addressing issues of lesbian health, or working on behalf of
LGBTQ people of color). For information, please contact the Caucus at cau-
cus @law.berkeley.edu.
Additionally, an annual lecture series in Mary's name will be hosted by the
Center for Social Justice starting in early 2005. For information, please contact
Mary Louise Frampton, Director of the Center for Social Justice, at
csj @law.berkeley.edu.
Mary Dunlap's poetry and artwork courtesy of Maureen C. Mason.
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